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Abstract
This paper provides an analysis of how a ﬁrm’s decision to serve a foreign market by exporting or
by engaging in foreign direct investment (FDI) affects ﬁrm productivity, when productivity is
endogeneous as a function of training. The main result of our paper is that, with endogeneous
productivity, exporting results in lower productivity than does FDI, but exporting may result in
higher or lower employment and output than does FDI. We also show that FDI has lower
employment, higher training, higher wages and higher productivity than does production for the
home market. A further interesting and unexpected result of our model is that exporting results in
the same level of training and productivity as does production for the home market. However,
under the same demand conditions, the exporting ﬁrm employs less labour for foreign production
than for home production and, consequently, output for the foreign market is lower than output for
the home market. In addition, we investigate the ﬁrm’s decision to serve the foreign market by
exporting or by engaging in FDI and determine parameter values for which either regime is
chosen.
JEL classiﬁcation: F22, F23
Bank classiﬁcation: International topics; Labour markets; Productivityiv
Résumé
Les auteures analysent comment la décision d’une ﬁrme de s’engager sur un marché extérieur par
la voie de l’exportation ou d’un investissement direct à l’étranger inﬂue sur sa productivité,
lorsque celle-ci est déterminée de façon endogène par la formation. L’étude révèle que, si la
productivité est endogène, les entreprises exportatrices sont moins productives que les entreprises
qui investissent directement à l’étranger; toutefois, les niveaux d’emploi et de production des
premières sont aussi élevés que ceux des secondes. Les auteures montrent par ailleurs que
l’investissement direct à l’étranger s’accompagne de niveaux de formation, de salaire et de
productivité supérieurs à ceux qu’implique la production de biens destinés au marché intérieur,
mais que le nombre des emplois est moindre. Autre résultat intéressant et inattendu du modèle,
l’activité d’exportation se caractérise par les mêmes niveaux de formation et de productivité que
la production tournée vers le marché national. Toutefois, sous des conditions de demande
équivalentes, la société exportatrice affecte moins de main-d’œuvre à la production de biens
d’exportation qu’à celle de biens destinés au marché intérieur, de sorte qu’elle produit davantage
pour celui-ci que pour le marché extérieur. Les auteures étudient également les facteurs sous-
tendant la décision d’une entreprise d’exporter ou d’investir directement à l’étranger et
déterminent les valeurs des paramètres qui président au choix de l’un ou de l’autre régime.
Classiﬁcation JEL : F22, F23
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Questions internationales; Marchés du travail; Productivité1 Introduction
Empirical studies have shown that exporting ﬁrms and ﬁrms that engage in foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) are more productive than their purely domestic counterparts (Yeaple, 2005;
Melitz, 2003; Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum, 2003; Baldwin and Gu, 2003, 2005;
Blomstr¨ om and Kokko, 1998). The theoretical literature has sought to examine the eﬀect
of productivity on ﬁrms’ decisions to participate in international markets. Helpman, Melitz,
and Yeaple (2004) forms part of this literature. In their study, ﬁrms are heterogeneous with
respect to their (exogeneous) productivity and, conditional on productivity, they sort them-
selves into purely domestic, exporting, and FDI ﬁrms. Abstracting away from diﬀerences in
preferences across countries, their analysis shows that low-productivity ﬁrms serve only the
domestic market, while more productive ﬁrms serve both the domestic market and foreign
markets. Of the ﬁrms serving foreign markets, the more productive ones engage in FDI, while
the less productive ones become exporters. This hierarchy reﬂects the fact that exporting
entails higher variable costs (i.e. it includes transport costs) than does production for the
home market and FDI entails higher ﬁxed costs than does exporting or production for the
home market. In a similar vein, Yeaple (2005) shows that even when ﬁrms are assumed to
be identical ex ante, exporting ﬁrms are more productive than purely domestic ﬁrms. In
this study, ex post ﬁrm heterogeneity arises because ﬁrms endogeneously choose to adopt
diﬀerent technologies and hire diﬀerent types of workers.
Our paper complements the literature and provides an analysis of how a ﬁrm’s decision
to serve a foreign market by exporting or by engaging in FDI aﬀects ﬁrm productivity.
The distinguishing features of our model are workers’ occupational choice and endogeneous
productivity. We incorporate the former by allowing workers to select where they work.
Worker mobility in our framework is, in fact, intra-company mobility of skilled labour.
Our set-up is meant to incorporate the growing importance of international mobility of
skilled labour both among OECD countries and between OECD countries and the rest of the
world. Recent studies show that skilled-labour mobility is becoming an important factor in
ﬁrms’ decisions to expand their operations abroad, and so FDI gives rise to increased labour
mobility through intra-company mobility of skilled labour (Gera, Laryea, and Songsakul,
2004; Harris and Schmitt, 2003; PricewaterhouseCooper, 2003; Globerman, 2001). Also in
this more recent literature, labour mobility reduces transactions costs and, therefore, attracts
1FDI. Furthermore, MNEs increasingly resort to intra-company transfers of skilled workers
to increase eﬃciency by training workers in the foreign aﬃliate faster and cheaper than
they can learn on their own (Markusen, 2005; Gera, Laryea, and Songsakul, 2004; Mercer
Human Resource Consulting, 2006).1 Our paper models intra-company labour mobility in
an occupational choice setting by assuming that workers bear an attachment-to-home cost
if they work for an FDI ﬁrm abroad. The attachment-to-home cost reﬂects workers’ cultural
and nationalistic preferences for working in their home country. Thus, a lower degree of
attachment-to-home reﬂects higher international labour mobility.2
Endogneous productivity is incorporated in our model in the ﬁrm’s decision to train work-
ers, which represents an important component of human capital investment that increases
worker productivity. In our context, we think of training as just one component that aﬀects
labour productivity, along with other factors that are exogeneous to our model. Our setting
thus allows us to examine how exporting, FDI, or production for the home market aﬀects
worker training. In the case of FDI, the ﬁrm employs home-country trained workers and
employee training is undertaken by the parent ﬁrm in the home country.
Elements of our model are similar to that in Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) in that
production for the domestic market entails lower ﬁxed costs than does production for export,
and production for export entails lower ﬁxed costs than does FDI. Furthermore, exporting
entails “melting-iceberg” transportation costs that raise variable costs relative to domestic
production and FDI. In our model, a monopolist ﬁrm always serves the home market, and it
serves the foreign market either by exporting or by engaging in FDI. The main result of our
paper is that, with endogeneous productivity, exporting results in lower productivity than
does FDI, but exporting may result in higher or lower employment than does FDI. Thus,
exporting may result in higher or lower output than would FDI. Our result thus shows that
FDI ﬁrms are more productive than exporters, and it is an important complement to the
result in Yeaple (2005) who ﬁnds that exporters are more productive than domestic ﬁrms.
We also show that FDI has lower employment, higher training, higher wages and higher
productivity than does production for the home market. A further interesting and un-
expected result of our model is that exporting results in the same level of training and
1This mechanism also gives rise to important spillover eﬀects when a trained worker leaves the MNE and
is hired by a local competitor (Fosfuri, Motta, and Rønde, 2001; Markusen, 2005). In this paper, we ignore
productivity spillover issues.
2See, for example, Mansoorian and Myers (1993) for more on the idea of attachment-to-home.
2productivity as does production for the home market. In particular, transportation costs
turn out to have no eﬀect on the optimal amount of training because the monopolist adjusts
its optimal employment level in response to changes in transportation costs so that the to-
tal eﬀect on training is zero. The exporting ﬁrm, however, employs less labour for foreign
production than for home production and, consequentely, output for the foreign market is
lower than output for the home market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and the
analysis to follow. Section 3 provides a comparison of employment and training in production
for the home market, for the foreign market through exporting, and for the foreign market
through FDI. Section 4 examines the factors that inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s decision to serve the




There are two countries, home, H, and foreign, F. Both countries produce a homogeneous
good, X, using a constant returns to scale technology with labour, LX, as the only variable
input. Industry X is perfectly competitive and good X is used as the numeraire. Good Y
is produced also using skilled labour, LY, as the only variable input. Producing good Y ,
however, requires a specialized technology, and workers in industry Y need to be trained
to some degree to use this technology. The production function is given by Y = A(t)LY,
where A(t) is productivity as a function of ﬁrm-speciﬁc training, t, and A(0) = 0. Training
increases worker productivity, A0 > 0, but at decreasing returns, A00 < 0, and it is costly for
the ﬁrm, with cost function given by K(t), and K0 > 0, K00 > 0.
One monopolist ﬁrm has gained access to a specialized proprietary technology in the
production of good Y . This ﬁrm is located in the home country. Production of good Y for
the domestic market alone entails ﬁxed costs of fD. In addition to producing for the domestic
market, the ﬁrm serves the foreign market either by exporting or engaging in FDI. The latter
entails employment of home-country trained workers. Employee training is undertaken by
the parent company in country H only. This allows us to incorporate endogenous labour
3mobility across countries into the model. Exporting involves ﬁxed costs fE and a “melting-
iceberg” transport cost per unit sold in the foreign market, τ > 1. The ﬁxed costs fE include
distribution costs in the foreign market. FDI entails ﬁxed costs fI, which include distribution
costs of servicing the foreign market and the additional costs of setting up an aﬃliate in F.
Thus, fI > fE > fD. Note that in the analysis that follows, we use a subscript to refer to the
industry, i ∈ {X,Y }, and a superscript to refer to the market in industry Y , j ∈ {H,E,I}.
We denote by PX and PY the prices of good X and Y , respectively. Workers earn a wage
wX in industry X and w
j
Y in industry Y , where j ∈ {H,E,I}. With a constant returns to
scale production technology, perfect competition in industry X implies that PX = wX = 1
in both countries, since good X is the numeraire.
2.2 Preferences and Occupational Choice
Consumers-cum-workers supply one unit of labour inelastically, but can choose to work in
industry X and earn wage wX or in industry Y and earn wage w
j
Y, j ∈ {H,E,I}. Working in
industry Y requires training, which entails a disutility cost, c(t), for the worker, with c0 > 0
and c00 > 0. We can think of training in our setting as training outside work hours.3 In
addition to this disutility cost, the worker bears an attachment-to-home cost, γ, if working
abroad. Workers thus bear a non-pecuniary cost of living abroad that reﬂects their preference
for working in their home country for cultural or nationalistic reasons. The attachment-to-
home parameter also captures the degree of international (intra-company) labour mobility;
a higher γ indicates lower mobility.
The preferences of a representative consumer are quasi-linear over goods X and Y , and
we assume constant elasticity of demand for good Y . More speciﬁcally, consumer preferences
are given by:





ε − c(t), (1)
where ε > 1 is the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand for good Y .4 The problem
for a consumer is to maximize utility (1) subject to the budget constraint:
X + PYY = M. (2)
3An example of training outside work hours is a night course or a weekend intensive training course.
4Recall that workers supply one unit of labour inelastically, which implies that the labour/leisure decision
does not enter the consumer’s optimizatio problem. However, the decision of where to supply that one unit
of labour is endogenous, and constitutes the consumer’s occupational choice decision discussed below.
4In country H, income, M, is dependent upon which type of ﬁrm the consumer is employed.
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wX, if i = X,
wH
Y , if i = Y, j = H,
wE
Y , if i = Y, j = E,
wI
Y, if i = Y, j = I.
(3)
From the ﬁrst-order conditions we derive a consumer’s demands for goods X and Y :






Note that, with quasi-linear preferences, consumer j’s demand for good Y is independent
of income, M
j
i . Thus, with identical preferences and populations, demand for good Y is
identical in H and F.





Y (PY) = P
−ε
Y , (7)
where Mi = (wX,wH
Y ,wE
Y ,wI
Y) denotes the vector of incomes.
In country H, an occupational choice equilibrium requires that workers be indiﬀerent
between working in industry X and industry Y . There are three possibilities for a worker in
industry Y . Either they can produce for the home market, or they can produce good Y at
home but for export to country F, or they can be sent abroad to produce good Y directly
in the foreign market. With quasi-linear preferences, an equilibrium entails that the worker
be indiﬀerent between these alternatives when he/she derives the same income from either
alternative. Thus, we have















depending on whether the industry-Y ﬁrm serves the foreign market through exports or FDI.
Proposition 1 With quasi-linear preferences, the wage rate is increasing in training.




H) = 1 + c(t
H), w
E
Y = 1 + c(t
E), w
I
Y = 1 + c(t
I) + γ, (9)




(tj) = c0(tj) > 0. Q.E.D.
This result shows that workers do not pay for training by receiving lower wages. Workers
are free to choose their occupation, i.e., industry X or industry Y , and this ensures that




, equals the marginal cost of training, c0.5 This result
is consistent with a number of empirical studies that ﬁnd that workers in training programs
do not receive lower wages (Bishop, 1991; Barron, Black, and Loewenstein, 1989; Barron,
Berger, and Black, 1993).
2.3 Employment and Training in Industry-Y
The monopolist in industry-Y selects labour and training to maximize proﬁts in the home and
foreign markets. An interior equilibrium allows us to analyze the two markets separately.
However, in order to lessen the burden of repetition on the reader, we will examine the
proﬁt-maximization problem for the “generic” case; that is, one that potentially includes all
possibilities. Table 1 summarizes these possibilities.
Table 1: Transportation cost and attachment-to-home
j H E I
τ = 1 > 1 = 1
γ = 0 = 0 > 0
We can examine the ﬁrm’s problem using two approaches, both of which yield the same
solution. One approach is to look at the ﬁrm’s problem in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage,
the ﬁrm hires workers and, in the second stage, it trains them. The two-stage approach
allows us to examine the interdependence of employment and training and derive partial
comparative statics properties of the optimal employment and optimal training functions.
The second approach is a one stage approach where employment and training are determined
5This assumes that there are no labour market imperfections and that workers can costlessly choose their
occupation.
6simultaneously by directly examining the ﬁrst order conditions. The one-stage approach
allows us to gain more intuition about the properties of the optimal employment and optimal
training functions. We begin with the two-stage approach and we will turn to the one-stage
approach in section 3.
We start with the two-stage approach. In the ﬁrst stage, the ﬁrm hires workers and, in
the second stage, it trains them. We begin the analysis in stage 2. The problem is therefore
















Y − fj, (10)
where the “melting-iceberg” transport cost is deﬁned in Table 1. The solution to the ﬁrm’s
problem at this stage is tj∗(L
j














Y = 0, (11)
where MR = (ε−1)/ε)Y −1/ε is the ﬁrm’s marginal revenue. We assume that the second-order



















Y = 0. (12)
Since both the ﬁrm and the worker capture a share of the returns on training in the form of
productivity increases and wage increases, respectively, each is willing to share the costs of
training.6












6The primary aim of our paper is to shed light on how ﬁrm participation in international markets by
exporting or FDI aﬀects ﬁrm productivity. Understanding all the incentives or disincentives facing ﬁrms in
training workers is beyond the scope of this paper. We thus assume away externalities that may result in
ﬁrms being unwilling to pay for worker training in the event that they do not capture all of the returns to
training.
7The ﬁrst property shows that the training function is decreasing in ﬁrm employment, which
reﬂects the fact that labour and training are substitutes in production. The second property
shows that, for given levels (L
j
Y,ε), the existence of transport costs provides a disincentive
for training in the exporting regime. The third property shows that a reduction in market
power, as measured by an increase in the price elasticity of demand, results in an increase
in training.
The ﬁrst stage of the ﬁrm’s problem is the hiring of workers, while anticipating the impact
of hiring on training in stage 2. The ﬁrm chooses the amount of labour to hire to maximize
Π(L
j












j∗)) = 0, (14)




(τ,ε,γ). We assume that the second-order condition for an























This property shows that the total eﬀect of an increase in the transport cost on employment
can be decomposed into two eﬀects. The ﬁrst one reﬂects the direct negative impact an
increase in τ has on the marginal revenue product of labour. The second eﬀect reﬂects
the second-order impact an increase in τ has on marginal revenue. That is, an increase in
τ, ceteris paribus, lowers optimal training, and thus lowers output. A decrease in output
raises marginal revenue, and thus an increase in τ has a positive eﬀect on optimal labour.
Although these two eﬀects work in opposite directions, we would expect that the direct eﬀect
of a change in τ dominates the second-order eﬀect. That is, we expect the exporting ﬁrm to
hire less labour for foreign production than for home production.

































8As would be expected, an increase in workers’ attachment-to-home increases their wage from




. Furthermore, an increase in the price elasticity
of demand lowers the ﬁrm’s market power, which raises employment.
We can now derive the total comparative statics properties of the optimal training func-
tion.


















































Proof: The proof is relegated to Appendix A. Q.E.D.
2.4 Labour market clearing
Completion of the equilibrium in the model requires that the labour market clears. Thus,



















∗ into (21) gives LX
∗.
3 Comparison of Employment and Training Across Pro-
duction Regimes
We now turn to the one-stage approach to solving the monopolists proﬁt-maximization
problem. After some manipulation, the ﬁrst-order conditions for the ﬁrm’s maximization
9problem with respect to tj and L
j












MR · A = w
j
Y + K. (23)













Equation (24) shows that, at the optimum, the technical rate of substitution equals the
economic rate of substitution. Equation (24) is particularly useful in understanding some of
the results in this section.
We are now in a position to examine how the levels of employment and training in
industry-Y compare in production for the home market, for export to country F, and for
FDI. Proposition 3 compares the performance of the FDI ﬁrm in the home market versus
the foreign market in terms of employment, training and productivity:
Proposition 3 FDI results in lower employment and higher training than does production









∗ follows from (16) along with the fact that γ = 0 for
home production and γ > 0 for employment abroad. Then, from (19) we know that optimal
training is increasing in the attachment-to-home. Because γ = 0 for a purely domestic ﬁrm
and γ > 0 for an FDI ﬁrm, it follows that tI∗ > tH∗. Q.E.D.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is straightforward. Higher attachment-to-home makes
labour more expensive abroad. As a result, ﬁrms choose to substitute training for labour,
thus increasing productivity. This implies that higher international labour mobility (lower γ)
makes hiring labour abroad cheaper and ﬁrms substitute labour for training. Hence, higher
international labour mobility results in lower productivity.




Proof: This follows from Propositions 1 and 3. Q.E.D.
10Higher training is reﬂected in higher wages. Since the FDI ﬁrm has higher training than
the purely domestic ﬁrm and workers’ attachment to home imparts a premium on working
abroad, it follows that the FDI ﬁrm also has higher wages.
Proposition 4 next compares the level of training and productivity of the exporting ﬁrm
in the home market compared with the foreign market:
Proposition 4 The exporting ﬁrm has the same level of training for home and foreign
production.
Proof: This follows directly from Proposition 2. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 is an interesting and unexpected result. We can understand this result by
referring back to equation (24). Equation (24) can be solved for tj∗, and since this equation
does not depend on τ, it follows that the optimal training is independent of transportation
costs, τ. Additional intuition for this result can be gained by breaking down the total eﬀect
of an increase in the transportation cost, τ, on training into two eﬀects as in (18). The ﬁrst
eﬀect is the negative direct eﬀect (∂tj∗/∂τ) < 0 and reﬂects the fact that, with transportation
costs, the exporting ﬁrm has a disincentive to train workers. The second eﬀect is the second-
order eﬀect of a change in the transportation cost working through changes in employment.
Since a change in transportation cost has, in general, an ambiguous eﬀect on employment,
the second-order eﬀect is of ambiguous sign. Proposition 4 shows, however, that the total
eﬀect is zero. That is, as transportation cost changes the exporting ﬁrm adjusts optimal
labour such that the total eﬀect on training is zero. This implies that the exporting ﬁrm
has the same level of training for both home and foreign production. Consequently, the
exporting ﬁrm has the same productivity for home production as for foreign production.
Note that this result is very general; it does not depend on the assumed preferences. In
fact, condition (24) is the same for any demand function and does not depend on the elasticity
of demand, ε. Furthermore, the same equation obtains when assuming diﬀerent demand
functions in the home and foreign countries and, a fortiori, diﬀerent demand elasticities in
the two countries. Hence, even when the exporter faces a more elastic demand function in
the foreign market it would still choose to adjust production by adjusting employment and
leaving training for home and foreign production equal. That is, for the exporting ﬁrm home
and foreign production are equally productive.
11Next, Propositions 5 compares the level of employment of the exporting ﬁrm for home
production compared with home production:






















1 + c(tj∗) + K(tj∗)
¸ε
, (25)
for j ∈ {H,E}. Since tH∗ = tE∗ and τ = 1 for home production and τ > 1 for foreign





The following result is a direct implication of Propositions 4 and 5.
Corollary 2 The output of the exporting ﬁrm is higher for the home market than it is for
the foreign market.
The intution for this result is straightforward. The exporting ﬁrm hires more labour for
the home production than for the foreign production and has the same level of training for
workers producing for the home and foreign market. The overall result is thus higher output
for home production than for foreign production. This result is consistent with the existing
empirical evidence that exporters usually export only a small fraction of their output.7
Proposition 6 next compares the foreign production performance of the FDI and the
exporting regimes in terms of level of training, productivity, and wages:
Proposition 6 FDI results in higher training, higher productivity and pays higher wages
than does production for export.








Y (tE∗) + K(tE∗)
=
c0(tE∗) + K0(tE∗)
1 + c(tE∗) + K(tE∗)
, (26)
7See, for example, (Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum, 2003; Bernard and Jensen, 1995, 1999; Clerides,
Lach, and Tybout, 1998; Aw, Chung, and Roberts, 1998). Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) ﬁnd
that around two-thirds of the U.S. exporters in their sample sell less than 10 percent of their output abroad.
12where the last equality comes from the occupational choice equilibrium condition. Similarly,











1 + c(tI∗) + K(tI∗) + γ
. (27)





1 + c(tE∗) + K(tE∗)
>
c0(tE∗) + K0(tE∗)
1 + c(tE∗) + K(tE∗) + γ
, (28)
since γ > 0. Q.E.D.
The intuition for Proposition 6 is straightforward. The presence of the attachment-to-
home premium for wages received when working abroad implies that, at tE∗, the technical
rate of substitution of the FDI ﬁrm is higher than the economic rate of substitution. Thus,
the FDI ﬁrm can increase its proﬁts by increasing training above tE∗. This implies that the
FDI ﬁrm chooses a higher level of training for foreign production than would an exporting
ﬁrm. Productivity and wages are consequently higher for the FDI ﬁrm than for the exporting
ﬁrm.
Finally, Proposition 7 compares the level of employment of the FDI and the exporting
ﬁrms:
Proposition 7 FDI may result in higher or lower employment than does exporting.
Proof: Manipulating the ﬁrst-order conditions for optimal employment under exporting




















1 + c(tE∗) + K(tE∗)
1 + c(tI∗) + K(tI∗) + γ
. (29)
As τ > 1 and tE∗ < tI∗ the ﬁrst two factors on the left-hand side and the term on the
right-hand side of (29) are less than one. The third factor on the left-hand side of (29)
may, however, be less or greater than one. That is, the exporting ﬁrm may hire less or more
labour for foreign production than the FDI ﬁrm. Q.E.D.
To illustrate how either case can arise in Proposition 7, consider the following example.
First assume the following functional forms for the training function, workers’ disutility cost
function, and ﬁrms’ training cost function: A(t) = tq, c(t) = ct, and K(t) = kt, where q < 1
13is the workers’ constant training eﬃciency and c > 0, k > 0. The assumption that q < 1



























for j ∈ {E,I} and γ = 0 and τ > 1 for the exporting ﬁrm and γ > 0 and τ = 1 for the




∗ as τ R (1 + γ)ε−q(ε−1).
The latter shows that as attachment-to-home becomes large/small relative to transportation
costs, the FDI ﬁrm will reduce/increase employment below/above that of the exporting ﬁrm.
Thus, employment can be higher or lower with exporting compared to FDI depending on
the relative magnitudes of transportation costs and attachment-to-home.
In section 4 we turn to the ﬁrm’s choice of serving the foreign market by exporting versus
FDI.
4 The Decision to Export or Engage in FDI
Our analysis in section 3 allows us to examine the factors that inﬂuence the monopoly ﬁrm’s
decision to serve the foreign market through exports or by engaging in FDI. Recall that the
exporting and FDI regimes embody diﬀerences in both variable and ﬁxed costs. Exporting
results in transport costs, but we have learned in section 3 that it also results in lower wages
and training than does FDI. Employment of labour is also diﬀerent under the two regimes,
and depends on the relative strengths of transport costs, training, and attachment-to-home.
FDI, on the other hand, entails higher ﬁxed costs than does exporting, which has obvious
implications for the decision to export versus FDI.
The comparison of proﬁts under the two regimes allows us to explore the competing
inﬂuences on the ﬁrm’s decision to export or engage in FDI. First note that, from (14), the




























Substituting these into the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function gives the following simpliﬁed expressions











































1 + c(tI∗) + γ + K(tI∗)
#ε−1
− fI. (35)
As noted above, there are competing inﬂuences of transport costs, training, employment
of labour, and attachment-to-home on the ﬁrm’s decision of how to serve the foreign market.
Recall that transport costs have no eﬀect on training, but they do reduce the employment of
labour. In (34) and (35), we see that they thus tend to make proﬁts higher under FDI than
under exporting, as would be expected. Attachment-to-home does aﬀect training, and we
have learned that it makes training higher under FDI than under exporting. Attachment-
to-home also has a direct positive eﬀect on wages. Both the training eﬀect and the direct
eﬀect on wages tend to make employment of labour lower under FDI than under exporting.
Oﬀsetting this, however, is the fact that higher training makes labour more productive, and
this tends to make employment of labour higher under FDI than under exporting.
A graphical analysis of the above discussion can shed more light on the competiting
inﬂuences on the decision to export or engage in FDI. For any value of ε > 1 and any given
diﬀerence in ﬁxed costs, fI −fE, we can derive a proﬁt indiﬀerence curve in (γ,τ)-space such
that πE = πI. Denote by





the locus of combinations of (τ,γ) that make exporting and FDI equally proﬁtable. Thus,










1+c(tI(ˆ γ))+ˆ γ+K(tI(ˆ γ))
¤ε−1 − (fI − fE)
#1/ε
. (37)
Note that the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between exporting and FDI for (∀) (ˆ τ, ˆ γ) ∈ S.
15Lemma 1 ˆ τ is increasing in ˆ γ.
Proof: The proof is relegated to Appendix 1. Q.E.D.
Proposition 8 The monopolist chooses to serve the foreign market by FDI for (∀) τ ≥ ˆ τ,
(∀) γ ≥ ˆ γ and by exporting for (∀) τ < ˆ τ, (∀) γ < ˆ γ, (∀) (ˆ τ, ˆ γ) ∈ S.
Proof: This follows directly by inspection of (34), (35) and Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
Figure 1 is a graphical representation of Proposition 8. The upward sloping curve in
Figure 1 represents combinations of (τ,γ) that make the ﬁrm indiﬀerent between exporting
and engaging in FDI. The area above the proﬁt-indiﬀerence curve is the region where the
monopolist chooses to serve the foreign market by engaging in FDI. Finally, exporting is
most proﬁtable in the area below the proﬁt-indiﬀerence curve.
Note that the proﬁt-indiﬀerence curve is drawn for given values of the demand elasticity,
ε, and given values of the ﬁxed costs, fE and fI. Changes in these values would result in shifts
of the proﬁt-indiﬀerence curve. Equation 37 shows that an increase in ε has an ambiguous
eﬀect on the proﬁt indiﬀerence curve. As would be expected, an increase in fI − fR shifts
the proﬁt indiﬀerence curve upwards, and thus increases the combinations of τ and γ for










Figure 1: Proﬁts from Exports and FDI
165 Conclusions
The primary aim of our paper has been to examine how a ﬁrm’s decision to serve a foreign
market through exporting or FDI aﬀects productivity. In our analysis, productivity is af-
fected by worker training, which is endogenous in our model. Workers are also free to select
their occupation. In this setting, we have shown that FDI results in higher training - and
hence higher productivity - than does exporting. We have also found that exporting results
in the same amount of training as does production for the home market. Our results for
the levels of training are driven by diﬀerences in variable costs between exporting and FDI.
These diﬀerences in variable costs also aﬀect the ﬁrm’s labour demand under home produc-
tion, exporting, and FDI. In particular, we have found that exporting may result in higher or
lower employment than does FDI. Thus, exporting may result in higher or lower output than
would FDI. The exporting ﬁrm, however, employs less labour for foreign production than for
home production and, consequentely, output for the foreign market is lower than output for
the home market. We have also investigated the ﬁrm’s decision to serve the foreign market
by exporting or by engaging in FDI and explored various parameter values for which either
case arises.
One main result of our paper—FDI is more productive than exporting—is an important
contribution to the literature which, to date, has only shown that exporting is more produc-
tive than purely domestic production (Yeaple, 2005). A natural extension of our paper would
be to incorporate endogenous training into a framework whereby many ﬁrms endogenously
sort themselves into purely domestic, exporting, and FDI ﬁrms. A further extension would
be to examine other imperfectly competitive market structures. An interesting and relevant
example of this would be strategic competition from a rival foreign ﬁrm, with the possibility
of luring trained workers away from the home ﬁrm. We leave these extensions for future
research.
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where the last equality follows from substituting in for ∆L and cancelling out like terms.
The second part follows directly from equations (13) and (16).
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where the last equality comes from substituting in for ∆L and cancelling out like terms.
B Proof of Lemma 1



















20This implies that ˆ τ is increasing in ˆ γ.
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